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In this article, the authors present a 
resident-based reimbursement system for 
intermediate care facilities for the mentally 
retarded (ICFs-MR), which represent a 
large and growing proportion of the 
Medicaid budget. The statistical relation-
ship between resident disability level and 
the expected cost of caring for the individual 
is estimated, allowing for the prediction of 
expected resource use across the population 
of ICF-MR residents. The system incorpo-
rates an indirect cost rate, a base direct 
care rate (constant across all providers), 
and an individual-specific direct care rate, 
based on the expected cost of care. 
INTRODUCTION 
Expenditures for mentally retarded 
individuals who reside in ICFs-MR repre-
sent a large and growing proportion of the 
Medicaid budget. Between 1975 and 1994, 
Medicaid payments to ICFs-MR rose from 
$0.4 billion to $8.3 billion. Per person spend-
ing (inflation adjusted to 1994 dollars) more 
than doubled from $22,598 in 1975 to 
$53,055 in 1994. However, although the 
number of recipients receiving ICF-MR 
services rose dramatically from 69,000 in 
1975 to 151,000 in 1981, in recent years the 
number of recipients has leveled off, with 
159,000 receiving such services in 1994. 
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The proportion of Medicaid payments for 
ICF-MR services rose from 3.1 percent of 
total payments in 1975 to 7.7 percent in 1994 
(Health Care Financing Administration, 
1996). 
Despite the large outlays for ICF-MR 
services, methods for determining 
reimbursement to a given facility are often 
based on historical average costs, which 
may have little or no relationship to the 
disability level of the residents being 
served (Myers and Stauffer, 1994). The 
disadvantage of a reimbursement system 
based on historical average costs is that it 
creates a disincentive for facilities to select 
individuals who are more disabled than 
past residents, and payments are not 
necessarily distributed equitably or 
economically across facilities. Access 
concerns for persons who are most 
disabled become magnified as cost-
containment efforts constrain overall 
budgets. The magnitude of ICF-MR expen-
ditures, the need for cost containment, and 
concern regarding the appropriateness of 
reimbursement levels have caused a 
number of States to examine the relation-
ship between their reimbursement 
methods and policy goals. Several States 
have recently undertaken studies to devel-
op reimbursement methodologies that are 
more closely tied to resident resource use 
(Chapin, Rotegard, and Manard, 1991; 
Brown et al., 1993; Myers and Stauffer, 
1994). Under Federal law, States have the 
flexibility to use such a payment methodol-
ogy as long as they do not exceed the 
upper limits "that can reasonably be 
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estimated would have been paid for those 
services under Medicare payment princi-
ples" (42 CFR 447.253.(b)(2), 42 CFR 
447.272(a)). However, States that partially 
base ICF-MR reimbursement on resident 
disability level (e.g., Kansas and North 
Carolina) use facility-averaged adjusted 
severity scores, which give equal weight to 
different measured disabilities. By averag-
ing severity scores across measured 
disabilities at the individual and then facili-
ty level, important differences in the costs 
of providing treatment for different disabil-
ities are missed. In this article, we describe 
a resident-based reimbursement system 
(RBRS) that is based on disaggregated 
measures of disability, in order to create a 
reimbursement model that weights the 
presence of some conditions more heavily 
than others. The financial and policy impli-
cations of severity-based reimbursement 
strategies are also discussed. 
ADVANTAGES AND 
DISADVANTAGES 
Because the reimbursement more nearly 
reflects the actual costs incurred by the 
provider, an RBRS is fairer and more 
economically efficient than a system based 
on historical average costs. Providers caring 
for residents with higher needs will receive 
higher payments, and if a facility's case mix 
changes during the year, the payment rate 
can be adjusted accordingly. Thus providers 
will have less financial incentive to select 
residents with lower need. It is important to 
recognize that providing higher payments 
to facilities that care for individuals with 
greater disability levels does not automati-
cally ensure that those individuals will 
receive needed care; to counteract any 
economic incentive to provide only minimal-
ly adequate care, an RBRS must be coupled 
with quality assurance surveillance, thereby 
enhancing State goals of quality care. 
However, the difficulty of developing and 
implementing reimbursement-related quali-
ty standards should not be underestimated, 
as there is no gold standard of care by 
which to compare facilities. 
The greatest disadvantage of moving to 
an RBRS is that such a system imposes 
computing and reporting requirements that 
could be substantially more burdensome to 
both providers and the State than those 
within a system that uses historical costs. 
The RBRS would also make it more difficult 
for providers to budget at the beginning of 
the fiscal year. Unless resident mix is 
absolutely stable during the year, some 
fluctuations in reimbursement will occur. 
Finally, some ICFs-MR would see their 
reimbursement fall, making a new system 
unpopular among these providers. 
COST COMPONENTS 
There are two components to 
reimbursable facility costs: direct and 
indirect. The direct cost of care includes 
staff and resource requirements necessary 
to provide disability-level-appropriate care 
to an individual resident of an ICF-MR. 
Direct costs are closely related to an 
individual resident's level of disability, but 
the link between these costs and resident 
disability level is not well developed. 
Therefore, our data collection and analysis 
efforts focused on the direct cost of care. 
To develop a reimbursement methodology, 
it is necessary to predict the direct costs of 
care for a given individual. In this article, 
we estimate the statistical relationship 
between measures of individual character-
istics and estimated individual resource 
requirements and build upon this link to 
develop a reimbursement methodology 
based on the resource requirements 
predicted to meet an individual's needs. 
Reimbursement to a facility must also 
include a component for the indirect cost 
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of care, including such items as property 
ownership and use (e.g., lease or rent, 
property insurance, real estate taxes), 
administrative and general costs, and 
operation and maintenance of plant. These 
costs are not strongly related to individual 
resident disability level and therefore can 
be determined at a facility level. Although 
the final reimbursement model presented 
here includes facility-specific indirect 
costs, we do not focus on calculation of 
these costs; although in some instances 
(e.g., homes for the medically fragile), 
indirect costs may vary based on resident 
severity, in general, resident disability 
levels and indirect costs are not strongly 
related. States employ a number of strate-
gies to minimize the variance in indirect 
costs across facilities (such as grouping 
facilities based on size, ownership, 
location, or property values, and imposing 
floors, ceilings, or average payment rates), 
but we do not deal with these issues in this 
article. 
DATA 
The study population included all 
residents of privately owned ICFs-MR in 
North Carolina. Individuals in State-owned 
ICFs-MR were excluded, as our contract 
was limited to private facilities. Data collec-
tion and analysis occurred during the 
period October 1994 through October 1995. 
Demographic, behavioral, and medical 
characteristics of all 2,290 residents in 
privately owned ICFs-MR were gathered, 
using the Developmental Disabilities Profile 
(DDP). The DDP was designed by the New 
York State Office of Mental Retardation and 
Developmental Disabilities (OMRDD) to 
provide a brief and relatively simple means 
of documenting key characteristics of 
persons with a range of developmental 
disabilities (Brown et al., 1986). Items in the 
DDP were selected because they had been 
shown to be or were expected to be predic-
tive of resource requirements and 
ultimately the cost of resident care. The 
DDP data for our sample were validated on 
a 10-percent random sample, stratified on 
individual and facility characteristics, drawn 
from the population of ICF-MR residents. 
Independent mental health/mental retarda-
tion professionals personally visited each of 
the facilities in which the sampled residents 
resided, reviewed records, and conferred 
with caregivers, other professionals, and 
administrators. The DDP instrument was 
found to be highly reliable (Kilpatrick et al., 
1996). 
Another instrument developed by the 
New York State OMRDD, the Staff 
Activities Survey, was modified and used in 
our research to capture the expected 
resource use associated with the care of 
each individual in the 10-percent sample. 
The Staff Activities Survey instrument 
contains a series of detailed items to assess 
individual resource needs in the following 
categories: medical/nursing care; personal 
care; capacity for independence; mobili-
ty/motor; and recreation and leisure. For 
each item, respondents were asked to 
assess the level of staff support required, 
the frequency and duration of staff assis-
tance, and the type(s) of staff support 
generally required. Information was also 
collected about expected staff response to 
problem behaviors. 
The survey was conducted through one-
on-one interviews with staff. Respondents 
included Qualified Mental Retardation 
Professionals (QMRPs), nurses (both 
registered nurses and licensed practical 
nurses), habilitation aides and coordina-
tors, and resident directors. Thirty-five 
percent of the surveys were answered 
solely by QMRPs, 7 percent by resident 
directors, and 5 percent by habilitation 
aides. The remainder of the surveys were 
completed by combinations of different 
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staff types working as a team. It is possible 
that the differing disciplines of the respon-
dents could produce some bias in the 
predictions of staff need. 
The Staff Activities Survey measures the 
resource use of a resident with a given 
disability level in a particular home. It is 
possible that two individuals with the same 
level of disability who reside in different 
homes would receive different levels of 
care. Inter-home variation would also be 
observed with time and motion studies. 
The advantage of the Staff Activities 
Survey is that responses are not directly 
influenced by the actual number of certain 
types of personnel resources available in a 
particular facility, as staff base their 
responses on expected need, regardless of 
whether or not the facility has the staff to 
actually meet those needs. Thus the pitfall 
common to empirically based staffing 
studies—that of perpetuating an observed 
staffing level that is constrained by exist-
ing funding levels—is avoided. 
To capture total expected daily resource 
use (in staff time) per resident, the Staff 
Activities Survey instruments were coded 
so that an aggregate measure of time 
required for care of each resident could be 
calculated. This measure was weighted by 
the average hourly salary of the type of 
staff providing the care, resulting in a 
single, weighted, staff cost measure. We do 
not know precisely what factors influence 
the variation in use of staff time and staff 
type across individuals. The type of 
caregiver providing a given service (e.g., 
nurse versus direct care staff) may reflect 
either the particular need of the resident or 
a particular facility's operating style. One 
advantage of weighting by staff salary is 
that the measure of resource use per day 
will accurately reflect the relative needs of 
the resident when higher cost staff is 
necessary because of disability levels. The 
disadvantage is that, to the extent that staff 
type merely reflects organizational style, 
the care needs of certain residents could 
be overstated or understated. 
Our final measure of resource use, the 
expected direct care dollars per day, clear-
ly overstates the staff time and/or staff 
skill level necessary to care for individuals 
in ICFs-MR. The mean value across the 10-
percent sample of $566 per day is skewed 
by a few outliers. The median value of 
$265.54, although still an overstatement of 
direct care resource use, gives a much 
clearer picture of the extent of "upcoding." 
It is clear from the Staff Activities Survey 
data that respondents may have answered 
with their estimates of ideal interventions, 
unconstrained by budgetary or staff limita-
tions. Although this potential inflation of 
staffing hours may bias the absolute 
reported hours, we do not believe that it 
will systematically affect the relative hours 
for residents with similar conditions. As is 
discussed later, we develop a relative, not 
absolute, resource use scale. 
PREDICTION OF DIRECT COST PER 
RESIDENT 
To establish the statistical relationship 
between the resident's profile (as 
measured by the DDP) and the expected 
resource use (as measured by the Staff 
Activities Survey), a regression was 
estimated. The dependent variable was the 
natural log of the expected dollars per day 
of staff resource necessary to care for the 
individual, as measured by the Staff 
Activities Survey. The independent 
variables were 13 parcels identified 
through a factor analysis of the DDP. This 
process, along with the fitting of the final 
regression model, is described elsewhere 
(Brown et al., 1986; Kilpatrick et al., 1996). 
The 13 parcels allow us to estimate a model 
that is both parsimonious and explanatory. 
The parcels are self-care, daily living, 
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cognitive, communication, fine motor, 
gross motor, number of seizures, number 
of medical conditions, number of medical 
consequences, number of medications 
prescribed, level of medication support, 
frequency of behavioral problems, and 
behavior consequences. In addition to 
these parcels, we added several variables 
that ICF-MR staff felt were important for 
predicting resource use: whether the 
resident uses a wheelchair or has a psychi-
atric diagnosis, and the resident's age and 
age squared. The variables and their defin-
itions are listed in Table 1. 
Table 2 reports the regression coefficient 
estimates from ordinary least squares, with 
direct expected resource use in log dollars 
employed as the dependent variable. We 
have retained all variables in the model, 
regardless of significance level, as prior 
work and discussions with providers 
suggest that all of the variables may be 
important predictors of resource use. If 
future work finds continued lack of signifi-
cance, it is possible that the model should 
be trimmed. The standard errors are Huber 
standard errors, which control for the fact 
that some of the respondents in our sample 
are from the same facility. Multiple observa-
tions from the same facility increase the 
likelihood of autocorrelation of distur-
bances, which would result in biased 
standard errors. The Huber standard errors 
take into account such autocorrelation 
(Stata Corporation, 1993). 
The model explains 25 percent of the 
variation in expected resource use for the 
243 individuals in the 10-percent sample 
with complete data. Although predictions 
made from this model will not be perfect, 
the amount of variance explained is similar 
to that found in severity-adjustment models 
in other practice settings (Thomas, 
Ashcraft, and Zimmerman, 1986). The 
challenge is to use these predictions to 
construct a reimbursement method that 
capitalizes on the predictive power of the 
DDP for individual resource requirements 
but is not excessively burdensome for 
providers or States. 
A second model was estimated that 
included organizational variables thought 
to be associated with the cost of care: the 
size of the chain to which a facility 
belonged and the number of beds in the 
facility. Although chain size was signifi-
cantly associated with expected resource 
use (specifically, the larger the chain, the 
lower the resource use), we decided not to 
use organizational variables in the 
algorithm to predict the cost per resident, 
as our intent was to develop a relationship 
between individual disability level and 
resource use, irrespective of facility 
characteristics. The other difficulty with 
including organizational variables, such as 
chain size, in the algorithm is that it is not 
known why large chains have lower costs. 
It is possible that the negative association 
between chain size and resource use 
reflects a lower standard of care in the 
larger chains. If this is the case, States may 
wish to keep reimbursement comparable 
to facilities in smaller chains in an attempt 
to raise standards of care. To the extent 
that the lower cost reflects economies of 
scale, States might wish to adjust payment 
rates downward for large chains. However, 
the addition of a manipulable organization-
al variable in a reimbursement model 
might create the wrong incentives. For 
example, if larger chains were reimbursed 
at a lower level, the large chains might 
simply form several smaller legal units in 
order to receive higher reimbursement. 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE SYSTEM 
The regression analyses allow us to use 
DDP scores to simulate the predicted log 
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Table 2 
Statistical Association Between the Log of Expected Dollars Needed for Care In Private 
Intermediate Care Facilities for the Mentally Retarded and Resident Characteristics 
as Measured by the Developmental Disabilities Profile 
Variable 
Self-Care Skills 










Gross Motor Skills 




















































































NOTES: n = 243. R-squared = 0.3018. Adjusted R-squared = 0.2490. 
SOURCE: Slifkin, R.T., Kilpatrick, K.E., Bollen, K.A., and Johnsen, M.C., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1995. 
cost of direct care for an individual. There 
are two different ways to use the predicted 
log cost for actual facility reimbursement. 
The first would be to simply take the anti-
log and reimburse at the predicted cost. 
We rejected this strategy for four reasons: 
(1) the resource use that was recorded on 
the Staff Activities Survey and subsequent­
ly used to create the dependent variable 
was clearly an overstatement of true costs; 
(2) there is no gold standard of appropriate 
levels of care for an individual with a given 
disability profile; (3) facilities must be 
reimbursed at a level sufficient to meet 
minimum Federal staffing requirements, 
regardless of disability levels of individual 
residents; and (4) reimbursing at the 
absolute predicted cost does not allow for 
the very real need for cost containment. 
Instead we use the predicted log cost as 
a predicted resource use (PRU) weight, in 
order to capture the intensity of resources 
needed to care for a given individual, 
relative to all other ICF-MR residents in 
the State. For a given individual, the PRU is 
calculated by the equation: 










constant, as reported in Table 2 
1, 2, …, 17 variables in the model 
(listed in Table 2) 
estimated coefficient, as 
reported in Table 2 
the individual's score 
We use the PRU in its logged form to 
reduce the possibility of extreme outliers. 
This weight can then be multiplied by a 
conversion factor that converts the PRU 
into dollars. The advantage of using a 
conversion factor is that it allows for control 
over total expenditures (e.g., expenditure 
containment compared with a prior 
reimbursement system might be desired), 
while still maintaining relative equity in 
reimbursement across disability levels. The 
conversion factor could be adjusted annual­
ly for inflation and also for geographic 
variation in input prices, if these were 
shown to vary substantially in a given State. 
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Because all ICFs-MR have basic direct 
care expenses independent of resident 
disability levels, the resident-based 
reimbursement system we present includes 
a direct base rate per diem that is constant 
for all providers. This base rate represents 
the reimbursement necessary to cover 
labor, food, and supplies for a minimum care 
resident and to meet Federal staffing 
requirements. The actual dollar amount of 
this rate should be determined by the 
individual State, to reflect market and 
regulatory conditions. Although we recog­
nized that determination of an appropriate 
direct base rate will be a difficult task, that 
was not the objective of this study. 
The RBRS would operate as follows: For 
any facility, the total daily reimbursement 
would consist of: 
















1, 2, …, n residents in the 
facility 
Total number of residents in 
the facility 
Total reimbursement 
Indirect per diem (facility or 
group of facilities specific) 
Direct base rate per diem 
Conversion factor 
Predicted resource units 
SIMULATION OF THE SYSTEM 
This section presents a demonstration of 
the RBRS, under the assumption that one 
goal of the reimbursement system is 
budget neutrality with an existing facility-
based reimbursement system. The PRU is 
calculated using the coefficient estimates 
from the analysis as already reported. The 
next step is to calculate a budget-neutral 
conversion factor: 
DA = (TDCD - (DPD × 365 × n))/365 


















1, 2, …, n residents in 
the State 
Dollars available 
Total direct care dollars 
per year 
Direct base rate per diem 
Total number of residents in 
the State 
Conversion factor 
Predicted resource units 
Minimum PRU value 
across all residents 
To illustrate these calculations, we used 
data for 2,290 individuals for whom 
complete DDP information was available. 
Total prospective yearly direct care expen­
ditures for these individuals was estimated 
at $112,027,286.50. 
Calculation of a Budget-Neutral 
Conversion Factor 
If we assume a direct base rate per diem 
of $100.00, the dollars available to be 
allocated based on individual PRU weights 
are calculated as: 
($112,027,285.50 - (100 × 365 × 2,290))/365 
= $77,924.07 per day 
The PRU weights for our sample ranged 
from 3.7248 to 7.7325. The lowest value 
was subtracted from all individual weights 
to norm the scale to begin at zero. The 
weights were then summed across all 
individuals, resulting in a total PRU in the 
sample of 4,763.77. A budget-neutral 
conversion factor was then calculated: 
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Conversion factor = $77.924.01/4,763.77 
= $16.36/PRU 
The issue of an appropriate level for the 
direct base rate per diem is critical. 
Although it is important to set a base rate 
that is high enough to allow all providers to 
remain in business, the lower the base 
rate, the more dollars available for distrib­
ution according to individual predicted 
resource use, as the conversion factor 
increases. As shown in Table 3, with the 
base rate set at $75.00, the conversion 
factor rises to $28.38/PRU, while for a base 
rate of $125.00, the conversion factor falls 
to only $4.34/PRU. It is important to note 
that the hypothesized base rates used in 
this example are for illustrative purposes 
only. Actual implementation of a system as 
proposed here would necessarily be 
preceded by a detailed cost analysis to 
ensure the adequacy of the base rate. 
Calculation of Resident-Based 
Reimbursement Rate 
To calculate the final RBRS, we use the 
historical cost-based indirect rates that 
were in place at the time of the study. 
Facility daily rates are calculated under the 
three different assumptions of a direct care 
base per diem rate: 
TR1 = n(IPD + $75) + 28.382Σi (PRUi) 
TR2 = n(IPD + $100) + 16.36Σi (PRUi) 










1, 2, …, n residents in a 
given facility 
Total daily reimbursement 
Indirect per diem 
Predicted resource units 
As shown in Table 4, changing the base 
rate within the constraints of remaining 
budget-neutral has a large impact on the 
range of reimbursement rates across 
homes. As the base rate increases, the 
variation in reimbursement rates across 
facilities will decrease. Although the mean 
reimbursement rate is quite similar across 
the two different base-rate calculations, the 
difference between the highest and lowest 
reimbursement rates is $41.03 when the 
base rate is $100.00, compared with only 
$15.18 when the base rate is $125.00. 
Table 3 
Calculation of Resident-Based Reimbursement Rate for Privately Owned 
Intermediate Care Facilities for the Mentally Retarded 
Formula 
DA = (TDCD - (DPD × 
365 × n))/365 
CF=DA/Σi(PRUi -
min(PRU)) 
TR = n(IPDf+ DPD) + 
CFΣi(PRUi) 
$75 Direct Base Rate 
($112,027,285.50 - (75 
× 365 × 2,290))/365 




TR1 = n(IPD + $75) 
+28.38Σi(PRUi) 
$100 Direct Base Rate 
($112,027,285.50 - (100 
× 365 × 2,290))/365 




TR2 = n(IPD + $100) + 
+16.36Σi(PRUi) 
$125 Direct Base Rate 
($112,027,285.50 - (125 
× 365 × 2,290))/365 




TR3 = n(IPD + $125) 
+4.34Σi(PRUi) 
SOURCE: Slifkin, R.T., Kilpatrick, K.E., Bollen, K.A., and Johnsen, M.C., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1995. 
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Table 4 
Facility Average Per Diem Reimbursement Rates for Privately Owned 
Intermediate Care Facilities for the Mentally Retarded, Using the 
Resident-Based Reimbursement System With Varying 























SOURCE: Slifkin, R.T., Kilpatrick, K.E., Bollen, K.A., and Johnsen, M.C., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1995. 
DISCUSSION 
The results of our study confirm earlier 
work in New York that showed that the 
DDP can reasonably predict expected 
resource consumption for individual 
residents in ICF-MR facilities. Using only 
resident characteristics available in the 
DDP, our model predicts the cost of expect-
ed resource use for an individual resident 
with sufficient precision to explain 25 
percent of the variation in cost of expected 
resource use. The factors contributing to 
the unexplained variance in the model are 
still unknown. Although it is likely that 
some of the unexplained variance results 
from individual characteristics that are not 
adequately captured on the DDP, there is 
also variation that is the result of the style 
of care in a particular facility. From inter-
views with providers, we believe that these 
style-of-care effects may be substantial. 
To the extent that a move from historical 
average costs to a disability-based 
reimbursement system recognizes that an 
individual with a certain set of disabilities 
should receive the same level of care 
irrespective of facility, the fact that facility-
specific differences are left in the residuals 
as unexplained variation is not a problem. 
These differences are removed from the 
calculation of an individual resident's PRU, 
which prevents a reimbursement system 
from locking into place what is, rather than 
what should be. However, more research is 
needed to control for these facility-specific 
differences to determine the extent to 
which the DDP accurately captures the 
particular individual resource needs across 
the array of disabilities seen in the ICF-MR 
setting. 
When moving to a disability-based 
reimbursement system, States must 
weight the precision of an instrument such 
as the DDP against the costs of using the 
instrument. Although the DDP does not 
completely account for all resident charac-
teristics that relate to resource use, it is 
relatively easy and inexpensive to imple-
ment. Past research has shown that 
assessments that are more precise also are 
more expensive to implement (Klein-
Parris, Clermont-Michel, and O'Neill, 
1986). If instruments that measure 
resident disability level are administered 
by the facilities, the cost will most likely be 
passed back to the States in some form. 
Therefore, States must balance the 
competing goals of precise measurement 
of disability with reasonable implementa-
tion cost when choosing an instrument. 
When implementing a reimbursement 
system that is based on facility-measured 
disability levels, States must make provi-
sions to ensure consistent responses 
across facilities by continually monitoring 
the quality of the data. Such an ongoing 
validation process is a necessary but possi-
bly costly endeavor. Further research is 
needed to know whether the added admin-
istrative complexity of a resident-based 
reimbursement system would be justified 
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by increases in resource-allocation efficien-
cy and improved alignment of provider 
incentives with the State's goal of equal 
access to care regardless of degree of 
individual impairment. 
As the demand increases for accountabil-
ity of State program expenditures, States 
will be pressed to have in place a measure 
of ICF-MR residents' progress in achieving 
higher levels of functioning. Instruments 
such as the DDP, in addition to being used 
for reimbursement, can be employed to 
track resident functioning over time. In 
fact, monitoring a home's progress on 
improving DDP scores (i.e., lower scores) 
could act as a force to counterbalance an 
incentive to increase DDP scores as a 
means of gaming the system toward higher 
reimbursement levels. 
One issue of concern when using an 
instrument such as the DDP for 
reimbursement is the extent to which 
actual resident behavior is weighted more 
heavily than potential behaviors that could 
occur if appropriate interventions were not 
provided. Use of this framework may result 
in adverse incentives: If providers spend 
more resources on aggressive interven-
tions that keep behaviors under control, 
the resident's disability level improves, 
resulting in a lower reimbursement rate. 
Conversely, lack of appropriate interven-
tion could result in worse behaviors and a 
higher reimbursement rate. There is a 
fundamental question behind this issue: To 
what extent can States ensure that private-
ly owned ICFs-MR provide an appropriate 
program of active treatment as required by 
Federal law? Federal regulations require 
that ICFs-MR provide a treatment program 
"that is directed towards the acquisition of 
the behaviors necessary for the client to 
function with as much self-determination 
and independence as possible" (42 CFR 
483.440(a)(l)(i)). Although a reimburse-
ment system designed to further that 
objective demands some measure of an 
individual's disability level, there is consid-
erable variability among providers as to 
what is considered appropriate active treat-
ment. In the absence of an industrywide 
gold standard, determining the actual 
dollar reimbursement that should be tied 
to a given disability level will be difficult. 
LIMITATIONS 
In this article, we have described a 
methodology for developing an RBRS. The 
intent of the article is illustrative rather 
than prescriptive, and we consider it 
preliminary in the difficult process of 
developing a reimbursement system based 
on individual disability level. It is important 
to emphasize that the model was devel-
oped using a relatively small sample and 
that the data came from a single State. 
Although this article informs the process 
of developing an RBRS, it is unlikely that 
the actual estimated coefficients reported 
in this article would be replicated if the 
model were estimated using a larger 
sample or with individuals who reside in 
ICFs-MR in other States. Therefore we 
would urge that this model be validated on 
other populations prior to its use. 
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